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On Recognising the Paradox of Sex
Joachim Daggx
George C.Williams and JohnMaynard Smith arrived at slightly different conclusions about the evolu-
tionary maintenance of sexual reproduction, despite that both were staunch neo-Darwinians, simply
because they approached the problem from different angles (life history vs. population genetics). This
difference between their perspectives made them notice the so-called paradox of sexual reproduction
for the first time. That is, Williams and Maynard Smith used their difference in perspective con-
structively, in order to raise a problem that had previously been overlooked by ‘monocular’ views.
Evidence from before, during and after the recognition of the paradox supports this thesis of con-
structive difference. First, Maynard Smith had diagnosed the individual cost of sexual reproduction
in full detail by 1958, but nobody raised an eyebrow for a decade. Second, both the correspondence
between Williams and Maynard Smith and their publications show that they saw the same problem
but against different backgrounds, because they viewed it from different perspectives. Third, further
differences between Williams and Maynard Smith concerning the evolution of sex make no sense
except in the light of the initial difference in their perspectives.
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1 Introduction
Discussions of the implications of sexual reproduction have appeared throughout the history of evolu-
tionary biology, from Darwin to Weismann, Fisher, Muller, Maynard Smith, and Williams (see e.g.,
Churchill 1968, 2010; Mooney 1993, 1995; Lustig 2000; Winther 2001; Meirmans 2009; Meirmans and
Strand 2010). The latest of these appearances highlighted an evolutionary paradox that had previously
been overlooked. In many animal and plant species reproduction is obligately sexual and also half the
offspring are male, yet the males contribute nothing but genes to reproduction. If asexual mutants of
such a species were to produce as many asexual offspring on average as sexual females in that species
produce daughters and sons, the growth rate of their population would be twice as large. Whereas half
the offspring of sexual females are noncontributory males, all the offspring of such an asexual mutant
would contribute to growth rate. Nevertheless, sexual reproduction prevails in most species and is not
lost evolutionarily.
This paradox of sex became topical in the early 1970s. Why not earlier? Inquiring into the prove-
nance of this problem raises several issues: What exactly was the problem? What happened in the period
before it was recognised? Who recognised it for the first time, and why? The short answer to the last
question is: George C. Williams and JohnMaynard Smith. They recognised it because they had different
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perspectives on the benefit of sex, but used their difference as a starting point for inquiry rather than as
a basis for dismissing each other. The following will address these questions in more detail.
Simply trying to isolate the paradox of sex is already perplexing, because even when related issues
like sex determination, sex allocation, and sexual selection are set aside, two intricately-related problems
remain: the evolutionary maintenance of sexuality (MS) and the evolutionary maintenance of recombi-
nation (MR). These can be separated conceptually only with respect to what question is being asked (i.e.
which evolutionary costs pose a challenge to sexual reproduction) and which observations are treated as
requiring explanation. However, the central effect of sexual recombination, undoing linkage disequi-
libria, affects both the MS and the MR. The issues are mechanistically linked and cannot be entirely
separated.1
2 Before the paradox: a timeline
The following historical sources illustrate the slow realisation that previously accepted explanations of the
significance of sexual reproduction implied a benefit to populations or species rather than to individuals.
Such a benefit had often been taken to require group selection. By the end of the 1950s, geneticists
had fully realised that sexual recombination cannot benefit individuals directly (e.g., Mather 1943; Fisher
1958; Muller 1958; Maynard Smith 1958; Stebbins 1959 in Tax and Callender 1960). However, for
another decade none perceived this situation as anomalous or paradoxical.
Fisher in 1930 and Muller in 1932
Fisher ([1930]1999: 121–123) defined the rate of evolutionary progress as the rate with which beneficial
mutations become fixed in a population. A beneficial mutation must have increased to a considerable
frequency in an asexual population before a second one has a good chance of occurring in an individual
already carrying the first. Otherwise, the two beneficial mutations would necessarily compete. In sexual
populations, however, beneficial mutations can arise in different individuals simultaneously, yet grow to
fixation independently, because of recombination (see also Mooney 1995).
1First, the two issues can be distinguished according to the observations taken to need explanation. For the MR (mainte-
nance of recombination), this is the observation that rates of recombination within genomes are variable but considerable in
species whose environment is stable, whereas theory would suggest otherwise (see below). On the other hand, Bell (1988: 126)
summarised the observations that need to be explained by any hypothesis for the MS (maintenance of sex):
1. the prevalence of sexual reproduction in animals and plants;
2. the taxonomic distribution of asexual taxa as terminal twigs rather than major branches of their phylogenies;
3. other correlates of parthenogenesis, for example, ecological ones with marginal, recent, or disturbed environments (ge-
ographic parthenogenesis).
Bell (1982: chapter 5.2.3) contradicted the idea that traits determining recombination rates correlate with traits determining
non-selfing sexual reproduction (amphimixis): “The fact that neither of the two major determinants of the amount of recom-
bination, the chiasma frequency and the chromosome number, have the same correlates as amphimixis makes it impossible to
sustain the proposition that sex and recombination are merely different aspects of the same phenomenon, to be explained by
any single rival hypothesis.” (Bell 1982: 435)
Second, the MR andMS differ in their evolutionary costs, and these in turn raise different questions. Recombination incurs a
cost because genotypes that have survived and developed to reproduce have thereby proven their adaptedness to the environment
they survived in and reproduce in. Natural selection should favour the reduction of recombination rates in a stable environment.
This would be possible through favouring mutations at loci affecting recombination rates. Mutations of these modifier genes
that reduce recombination rates will increase the probability that adaptive gene combinations stay together. Recombination
rates should sink towards zero in stable environments. Hence Turner (1967) asked: “Why does the genotype not congeal?”
Sexual reproduction incurs a different evolutionary cost, the reproductive disadvantage in competition with an asexual mutant
that produces as many clonal offspring as sexual females produce daughters plus sons. Facing such a competitor, the selective
disadvantage of a sexual female will, all else equal (see footnote 7), be a shipwrecking 50%. Asexual mutants should replace
sexual individuals before their recombination rates seriously diminish. Recombination modifiers, on the other hand, do nothing
to reduce this demographic cost of sex, whether they decrease crossing-over gradually or stop it abruptly (Felsenstein 1985: 217;
1988: 82). Hence the questions: “What use is sex?” (Maynard Smith 1971b), “Why reproduce sexually?” (Williams and Mitton
1973).
Third, the issues are connected like Siamese twins, because sexual recombination undoes linkage disequilibria and that affects
both the MS and the MR. Only a few studies focus on the MR or the MS exclusively (e.g., Krieber and Rose 1986; Edmonds
and Rose 1988; Neimann 2004; West-Eberhard 2005; Dagg 2006).
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In a letter to C. S. Stock (24 Oct. 1932), Fisher affirmed his hypothesis that sex accelerates the rate
of fixation of simultaneously-arising beneficial mutations:
I think you have stated the functions of sex exactly. I imagine forms like the dandelion which
are believed to be wholly non-sexual may thrive immensely for a time, but would eventually
be so slow in modifying themselves to suit changed conditions that they will not contribute to
the ancestry of flora of the remote future. For this purpose, however, a very low percentage
of crossing would, I believe, be effective. The penchant for obligate cross-breeding seems to
me explainable only by the predominantly unfavourable nature of mutations. (reprinted in
Bennett 1983: 264)
Muller (1932) mentioned two advantages of sexual recombination: 1. the continual shifting of geno-
type frequencies in response to ever-changing environmental conditions, which has been associated with
Weismann (Mooney 1995); 2. the simultaneous growth to fixation of permanently favourable mutations,
which is similar to Fisher’s explanation. He thought the first less important than the second.
There are two ways in which recombination of gene mutations is valuable. One, by far the
lesser way, is the providing of an opportunity for continual shifting and readjustment of the
relative abundance of different types as external conditions vary back and forth, and here and
now one, there and then another combination becomes more advantageous for the main-
tenance of the species. In this process heterozygosity is an asset, and the disadvantageous
combinations continually produced are an insurance against the day when some of them will
be needed.
The other, the major value of recombination, is the production, among the many misfits,
of some combinations that are of permanent advantage to the species and that eventually be-
come fully established in it as a part of its normal constitution. Without sexual reproduction,
the various favourable mutations that occur must simply compete with each other, and either
divide the field among themselves or crowd each other out till but the best adapted for the
given conditions remains. In asexual organisms, before the descendants can acquire a com-
bination of beneficial mutations, these must first have occurred in succession, within the same
lines of descent. In sexual organisms, however, most of the beneficial mutations that occur
simultaneously, or in different original lines of descent, can increase largely independently
of one another and diffuse through one another, as it were. (Muller 1932: 121)
In both cases the benefit of sexual recombination would be long term and would accrue to the whole pop-
ulation. But this was no explicit group selectionism, because it did not consider this benefit as overcoming
the advantage to an individual, asexual mutant.
Sturtevant and Mather in 1938
Sturtevant and Mather contradicted Muller’s assessment of the relative importance of these two advan-
tages by stating that recombination would only be beneficial in stable environments under certain circum-
stances. It would confer an advantage when it combined two advantageous mutations, but it would be
detrimental the next time around. (This implies a focus on individuals rather than populations.) Sturte-
vant andMather emphasised the flexible shifting of genotypes in response to ever-changing environments
instead:
Two solutions have been proposed, viz.: (a) that recombination makes it possible to ob-
tain favourable combinations of mutant types which have arisen independently, and (b) that
recombination increases the “flexibility” of the species in its ability to adapt itself to ever-
changing environmental conditions.
The former suggestion clearly indicates an advantageous property of recombination, but
it would seem that the resulting selection in favor of crossing over would be very small, since
such recombination need occur but once. Indeed subsequent recombination would be dis-
advantageous in breaking up the new favorable combination. […]
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The second possibility, concerning the “flexibility” of the species, seems to be of greater
moment, but it has never been analyzed in sufficient detail to bring out the essential prereq-
uisites for its functioning. (Sturtevant and Mather 1938: 450f)
They suggested that the environment needs to change frequently between conditions favouring different
genotypes (Sturtevant andMather 1938: 451). But they did not assert that the environment would need to
change as frequently as sexual reproduction occurred, in order for this advantage to accrue to individuals.
Under stable environmental conditions, however, selection should reduce recombination, for example
through inversions.
Mather in 1943
Mather (1943) saw the individual cost of recombination, separating favourable gene combinations, and
suggested a trade-off between present fitness and future flexibility:
Heritable variability is necessary for adaptive change, but, in that it implies some individuals
departing from the optimum, it lowers present fitness […] The success of any organism in
competition with its contemporaries, must depend on the extent to which it reconciles these
needs. Failure to achieve an adequate balance spells either its own doom, on the one hand,
or that of its descendants, on the other. Existing organisms must therefore have descended
from those which had most adequately balanced the advantages of fitness and flexibility in
the past. The organisms of the future will equally be descended from those which, to-day,
best reconcile the needs of fitness and flexibility, the rest dying out sooner or later. (Mather
1943: 44)
Fisher in 1945 and 1958: ‘The benefit of the species’
Fisher denied the plausibility of group selection in a letter to J. F. Crow on 23 June 1945.2 In the sec-
ond edition of The Genetical Theory of Natural Selection, however, he admitted the possible species-benefit of
sexuality:
…Any characters ascribed to interspecific selection should of course characterize, not species,
but whole genera or families, and it may be doubted if it would be possible to point to any
such character, with the possible exception, as suggested in Chapter VI, of sexuality itself,
which could be interpreted as evolved for the specific rather than for the individual advan-
tage. (Fisher [1958: 50]1999: 280)
Muller in 1958
In the same year Muller attempted to quantify the degree to which sexual recombination accelerates
evolution, but he also recognised the individual cost of sex in passing:
It is true that some groups of organisms, including even higher organisms, in every period
of the earth’s history, have dispensed with sexual reproduction in fact or in effect, and that
this has given them the considerable temporary advantage of being able to multiply without
having to wait for the nuisance of finding and pairing with one another first. But these can
have only a transitory splurge and are doomed to fall behind in the long evolutionary race
and to disappear. They furnish an illustration of the short sightedness, the opportunism, of
natural selection. The stem forms of evolution, from which the organisms of later periods
will be derived, are those that pay their tax to sexuality and are repaid in novel developments.
(Muller 1958: 153)
2“Thanks for your letter with the interesting discussion of intercommunal selection. [Dr. J. F. Crow had written asking Fisher
to comment on a discussion paper on the roles of inter- and intra-population selection.] In thinking about this subject in the
past I have been impressed by the relatively long life ascribable to such ‘perfectly insulated’ communities, and, therefore, with
the implausibility of ascribing insulation which shall be perfect relative to their long existence. In fact, I think that complete
insulation of the degree required, such as could of course occur through geological changes, must be taken to preclude real
competition between the imagined groups.” (Quoted in Bennett 1983: 189)
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Maynard Smith in 1958
In 1958, again, John Maynard Smith popularised the established knowledge of evolutionary theory for
non-specialists, updated with Drosophila genetics. Already in this work he analysed fully what would later
become the paradox of sex:
If the rate of increase of an animal population were limited by the number of eggs which
each female could lay, which in turn depended on how much food a female could eat and
transform into eggs, then a population consisting entirely of parthenogenetic females would
increase twice as fast as would a population of equal numbers of males and females. From
the point of view of reproduction, males are a waste of living material. (This argument does
not hold for hermaphroditic organisms, or for those animals in which both parents help to
feed the young.)
The compensating advantage of the sexual process is that it increases the range of po-
tential variation in a population, and therefore its evolutionary plasticity. (Maynard Smith
1958: 138)
However, this insight neither perplexed Maynard Smith nor threw him into crisis. He simply con-
cluded:
Now if the advantage of sexual reproduction is that it increases the range of potential vari-
ation in a population, then the advantage refers to the population as a whole, and not to
any particular individual in it. It follows that sexual reproduction has been established as the
rule, both in animals and plants, because selection favoured some populations at the expense
of others. This forms a contrast to the examples discussed in the last chapter, in which the
‘unit’ selected was the individual and not the population. (Maynard Smith 1958: 139)
Stebbins at a centennial celebration in 1959
The University of Chicago organised a celebration of the centennial of Darwin’sOn the Origin of Species and
published the proceedings in three volumes. The third volume reports the deliberations of the participants
concerning various issues in evolutionary biology. In particular, one panel chaired by Julian Huxley and
Alfred E. Emerson and attended by Daniel I. Axelrod, Theodosius Dobzhansky, E. B. Ford, Ernst Mayr,
A. J. Nicholson, Everett C. Olson, C. Ladd Prosser, G. Ledyard Stebbins, and Sewall Wright dealt with
the evolution of sex as an illustration of the evolutionary process. Stebbins formulated their consensus as
a compromise between future and present needs:
Why is it that in higher organisms sex seems so essential and is never lost, whereas such or-
ganisms as fungi and bacteria get along for very long periods without sex or with only a very
small amount of genetic recombination? […] Some years ago, Kenneth Mather pointed out
that the genetic recombination system must establish a compromise between two conflict-
ing needs. One need is genetic insurance—generating sexual combinations that at present
may have no selective value but may become essential in the future when the environment
changes. The other need is to generate the largest possible number of individuals that are fit
at the present time. And the balance—the compromise between these needs—is likely to be
very different in different organisms.
Take, for instance, a bacterial colony in which millions of individuals are produced in one
day, with the generation time a tiny fraction of what it is in man. Here new genotypes can
perhaps be generated in large part by occasional mutation or even successions of mutations,
as in the adaptation of bacteria to streptomycin. In this case, sex is perhaps of less selective
value than in the slowly reproducing higher animals. And in plants the larger, more slowly
reproducing perennials and woody plants usually have a high degree of cross-fertilization
and genetic recombination through a high chromosome number, whereas the weeds—the
pioneers—usually have self-fertilization and sometimes asexual reproduction. This is associ-
ated with the fact that a plant in a vacant and relatively uniform habitat is most successful if
 open access – Freely available at philosophyandtheoryinbiology.org
Dagg - The Paradox of Sex 6
it generates a large number of offspring similar to itself. (Stebbins in Tax & Callender 1960:
126).
Crow and Kimura in 1965
Crow and Kimura (1965) are usually credited with explicating the group selection implications of early
explanations:
The development of sexual reproduction confers no immediate advantage on the individual
in which this occurs. In fact, the result is far more likely to be deleterious. The benefit is
only to the descendants, perhaps quite remote, and to the population as a whole. Thus, it
seems likely that the selective mechanism by which recombination was established was inter-
group selection. […] On the other hand, despite the great evolutionary advantage of sexual
reproduction, there are immediate advantages in return to asexual reproduction. An advan-
tageous type whose recombinant progeny were disadvantageous would have an advantage
for its immediate descendants by developing an asexual mode of reproduction, other things
being equal. (Crow and Kimura 1965: 448)
This, however, did not entail a paradox or crisis for them either. On the contrary, they concluded:
This all accords with the conventional belief that sexuality developed very early in the evolu-
tion of living forms and is therefore found in all major groups; but that numerous indepen-
dent retrogressions to vegetative reproduction continue to occur, conferring an immediate
advantage but a long time evolutionary disadvantage. (Crow and Kimura 1965: 448)
Maynard Smith (1968) also did not question their general conclusion, but criticised a specific assump-
tion they made in order to model Muller’s hypothesis that recombination serves to accelerate the fixation
of simultaneously occurring beneficial mutations. Maynard Smith (1968) modelled a counter-example of
an infinite population with mutants occurring in deterministic frequencies rather than being unique, ini-
tially. He concluded that recombination helps in changing environments instead. This exchange caused
no feelings of either anomaly or paradox for him.
Later, Felsenstein (1974: 741) emphasised the critical difference between models of finite populations,
where favourable mutants are unique individuals, and infinite model populations, where all possible geno-
types are present at equilibrium frequencies from the start. That is, the differing outcomes forecast by
Crow and Kimura (1965) and by Maynard Smith (1968) were due to the absence or presence of genetic
drift. Maynard Smith (1968) missed the advantage of sexual recombination in undoing linkage disequi-
libria due to drift, because his infinite model population already was in linkage equilibrium.3 Felsenstein
(1985; 1988) unified these and other theories about the advantage of recombination. He distinguished
Fisher-Muller theories, in which genetic drift causes linkage disequilibria, from Sturtevant-Mather theo-
ries, in which varying selection causes linkage disequilibria.4
3Felsenstein and Yokoyama (1976) simulated the extreme case of full or zero recombination. The only difference between
recombining and non-recombining genotypes was the absence or presence of recombination in the diploid stage. The whole
genome consisted of only one pair of homologous chromosomes, in order to exclude recombination through segregating het-
erologous chromosomes. The model assumptions also resulted in the rate of increase being equal for the recombining and
non-recombining parts of the population, and they resulted in the parent-offspring relatedness being equal for all genotypes.
(For recombinant offspring r = 0:5; for non-recombinant offspring r = (1 + 0)/2. That is, half of the time relatedness was
1 and the other half it was 0, because in non-recombining types randomly one or the other gamete produced the offspring
clonally.)
4Recent advances in population genetics have shown that this Hill-Robertson effect can also work in large but finite popu-
lations. Recombination breaks down associations between deleterious and beneficial alleles at different loci. The benefit of this
effect can, under certain circumstances, even balance the twofold cost of sex (Keightley and Otto 2006; Hartfield and Keight-
ley 2012). That is, within-population selection for recombination could override the advantage of competing but genetically
isolated asexual clones.
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3 The parallactic recognition of the paradox
While Williams started from life-history studies, Maynard Smith’s point of departure was population
genetics. Though both their approaches were strictly neo-Darwinian, their approaches led them to view
the maintenance of sex against different backgrounds. However, neither simply dismissed the other’s
perspective. Instead, they used their difference in perspective to expose a problem that had previously
not been seen, in a way analogous to how our brains use the parallax between our eyes to acquire 3-
dimensional information. This required mutual respect and trust in each other’s observations.
Williams in 1966: life-histories suggest immediate benefit
Life-history theory explains key events in an organism’s life-cycle as shaped by natural selection. In or-
ganism with asexual and sexual modes of reproduction, the sexual mode occurs when the offspring meets
unpredictable conditions (Bonner 1958). An example is when dispersal stages are produced. Williams
came from this tradition and tried to explain the maintenance of sex in terms of life-history theory. He
interpreted sexual reproduction as a life-history adaptation:
The machinery of sexual reproduction in higher animals and plants is unmistakably an
evolved adaptation. […] Reproduction is sexual if it produces offspring with new combi-
nations of the parental genes, and does so by means of machinery designed to produce that
result. (Williams [1966]1996: 125)
That is, he took sexual reproduction to be an adaptation and went on to discuss whether it was a group
adaptation or an individual adaptation. His terms were ‘biotic’ and ‘organic’ for group and individual
adaptation respectively.
Williams argued for individual (‘organic’) adaptation in terms of life-history evolution (Williams [1966]
1996: 130–133). In life-cycles with sexual and asexual phases, sexual reproduction usually occurs when
offspring face environmental conditions producing different selective pressures from those faced by their
parents. For example, the dispersal stages of many organisms are produced sexually and not clonally. If
sexual reproduction were a group (‘biotic’) adaptation instead, no such pattern should be expected, be-
cause the benefit to populations does not depend on the timing of gene-shuffling in life-cycles (Williams
[1966]1996: 131).
Williams on 30 Jan. 1969: letter to Maynard Smith
Williams informed Maynard Smith that an ‘orphaned’ paper by Maynard Smith could be included, as
the only original contribution, in a collection of published articles on the group selection controversy
edited by Williams (1971). He went on:
As long as the paper [Maynard Smith 1971a] continues to point out that there would seem
to be an immediate 50% disadvantage in meiosis, and that explaining sexual reproduction
is a major evolutionary problem, it will serve an important function in the book.
Meanwhile I will use the occasion to goad myself into putting together an alternative to
the view that the evolutionary significance of sex is in its role in the evolutionary process. It
will not really be an alternative to the views expressed in your paper, but rather a supplement
to them. Or, more accurately perhaps, it will be a multi-page alternative to your page 16. I
think I can get it to you in about 2 weeks. (Williams, 30 Jan. 1969)
The article eventually published (Maynard Smith 1971a) takes up 10 pages of main text. Hence the
manuscript page 16 he referred to (above) would have been towards the end of the article. And indeed,
the last section of it deals with the maintenance of sex, the preceding sections being on the connection
with the group selection controversy, the classic arguments that sex accelerates the fixation of simultaneous
beneficial mutations, the origin of sex, and the sex-ratio.
Hence, Williams’s letter to Maynard Smith (see quote above) suggests that they agreed on the diagno-
sis of the problem but were not completely in accord with respect to their conclusions about it. Maynard
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Smith concluded that the short-term advantage of asexual reproduction was balanced by long-term ex-
tinction, and he called this group selection:
It is well known that asexual varieties of plants arise quite commonly, and that their distri-
bution, geographical and taxonomic, suggests that they are successful in the short term but
in the long term doomed to extinction. (Maynard Smith 1971a: 171)
Maynard Smith on 13 Feb. 1969: letter to Williams
Unfortunately, the George C. Williams Collection at Stony Brook holds no correspondence from Williams to
Maynard Smith from the two weeks following 30 Jan. 1969 (Lynn Toscano, pers. comm.). In a letter
from 13 Feb. 1969, however, Maynard Smith responded to comments by Williams that are not on record
in Williams’s letter from 30 Jan. 1969. They must be responses to a lost letter. Among other things, he
addressed Williams’s alternative, that sex is maintained because it produces variable offspring:
I accept that your “rotifers in pitcher plant”model would favour sex. But I am a bit suspicious
of models involving a number of generations, in isolation followed by crossing. My “mice in
haystacks” model (Nature, 201, 1145) is of this kind, and can produce altruism by group
selection.
Everything therefore depends on whether the same mechanisms could operate without
cyclical parthenogenesis and a discontinuous environment. I look forward to seeing your
arguments on this in more detail.
I did, in fact, consider the advantage of producing genetic variability when writing my
article, though I did not work out the idea in any detail. I did not draw what you believe to be
the “obvious conclusion” because I found it difficult to devise “model situations”, in which
sex would win over parthenogenesis because of the variability of the environment. (Maynard
Smith, 13 Feb. 1969)
This is interesting for several reasons. It shows that Williams was already groping towards his aphid-
rotifer model which would later be published in full by Williams and Mitton (1973) and Williams (1975).
Secondly, Maynard Smith accepted that this life-history model would favour sex, but maintained that
group selection could still play a role in it, as in his haystack model. Thirdly, Maynard Smith clearly saw
that his haystack model (see Maynard Smith 1964) could produce altruism through group selection.5
Maynard Smith in 1971: population genetics against immediate benefit
Maynard Smith (1971b) did eventually model situations in which the variability of the environment would
favour sexual reproduction, and he concluded that the environment would need to change capriciously for
sex to benefit individuals. While Sturtevant andMather (1938: 450) had already pointed out that crossing-
over destroys favourable gene combinations as quickly as it creates them, Williams ([1966]1996) seems to
have been unaware of that implication. Here, Maynard Smith (1971b) directly addresses Williams:
Two different types of explanation have been offered for the widespread occurrence of sexual
processes. The first and most generally accepted explanation is that populations with sex
can evolve faster than those without it; hence in the long run sexual populations will survive
and asexual ones die out. This, which I will refer to as the “long-term explanation”, has
not been universally accepted. In particular, G. C. Williams (1966) has criticized it on the
grounds that it requires selection to act between groups rather than between individuals. He
has therefore preferred what I will call the “immediate explanation”, namely that sexually
reproducing individuals produce offspring with a wider range of phenotypes, and hence have
5Conversely, D. S. Wilson claims that Maynard Smith biased the assumptions of his haystack model against group selection
and that “Maynard Smith concluded that altruism could not possibly evolve by group selection” (Sober and Wilson 1998: 70).
This may be a semantic problem. Maynard Smith took the long term extinction of selfish groups to be group selection, whereas
Wilson meant the short-term interaction of trait-groups.
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a greater immediate chance of producing some offspring of high fitness. (Maynard Smith
1971b: 319f)
He rejected the idea that offspring variability immediately benefits sexual individuals, because this would
require selective pressures to alternate signs between generations; that is, gene combinations that were
advantageous in one generation would need to become disadvantageous in the next, and vice versa.
In general, if the correlations between adaptively significant features of the environment
commonly change signs between one generation and the next, sexual reproduction will in-
crease the mean fitness of the offspring produced; if, as seems likely to be the more usual
situation, such correlations tend to remain the same, sexual reproduction will reduce the
mean fitness of offspring. (Maynard Smith 1971b: 330)
Maynard Smith (1971b: 333) affirmed the orthodox view that sex accelerates the adaptation of popula-
tions instead. As before (Maynard Smith 1971a), he mentions the twofold advantage of parthenogenetic
mutant females. Such an asexual mutant introduced a new challenge, because its advantage should
subvert the benefit of sex to its population. Besides the need to explain the MR, which is to say why
recombination rates do not sink to zero within an otherwise sexual species, there was now the additional
need to explain the MS, or why asexual species do not crowd out sexual species.6
Williams (1971: 12) took away the message that “there is near unanimity on the point that sexuality
functions to facilitate long-range evolutionary adaptation, and that it is irrelevant and even detrimental
to the reproductive interests of an individual.” He also perceived the peculiar position of Maynard Smith
and his own need for a plausible theory of the MS based on individual selection:
The nearly universal existence of the sexual cycle of meiosis and fertilization […] is per-
haps the most crucial evidence on the importance of group selection. Why this is so is clear
from the paper by [Maynard] Smith, who is usually rather firmly on the other side of the
controversy. Sexual reproduction must stand as a powerful argument in favor of group se-
lection, unless someone can come up with a plausible theory as to how it could be favored
in individual selection. (Williams 1971: 161).
Even Williams’s suggestions ‘For Further Reading’ shed light on the disagreement between Williams and
Maynard Smith concerning the immediate benefit of sex. On Maynard Smith (1971b) he suggested:
Here the author [Maynard Smith] elaborates further on some of the ideas expressed in his
paper in this volume, and criticizes the theory advanced by the present editor (in entry un-
der Williams, below), that sex can be a favorable reproductive strategy for an individual.
(Williams 1971: 205)
About his own book, Adaptation and Natural Selection, he said:
This book develops arguments against group selection in several applications. It also ad-
vances reasons for believing that sexual reproduction is advantageous in individual selection,
but does not explain how the disadvantage of genetic loss in meiosis [cost of meiosis] can be
overcome. (Williams 1971: 205)
6Graham Bell (1982: 47) aptly described the predicament this caused for evolutionary biologists: “It was the very success of
this attack [on group selection] which led population biologists to realize how embarrassing sex is. Most supposedly altruistic
behaviours were quickly found either to have concealed advantages for the individual, or else to be directed towards the welfare
of closely related individuals. But sex appeared to fit into neither of these categories: if it permits the rapid mobilization of
genetic variation, then this may be a matter of vital concern for the population, but does not in itself concern the individual.
Evolutionary biologists thus found themselves on the horns of a dilemma: either the apparently unsatisfactory hypothesis of
group selection was indeed an adequate explanation for the maintenance of sexuality, or else a quite different hypothesis framed
in terms of natural selection must be sought.”
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Disagreeing about the cost of sex
All else equal,7 an asexualmutant should have twice the rate of increase of sexual individuals. This twofold
cost of sex seems to be a common assumption. However, Maynard Smith (1958: 138) had located the cost
of sex in the cost of producing males from the very beginning (“From the point of view of reproduction,
males are a waste of living material.”), whereas Williams ([1966]1996: 130) located the cost of sex in
choosing to reproduce by meiosis and gamete fusion rather than by cloning.
Their different understandings of the cost of sex were not due to a conceptual confusion on the part
of either of them, but rather to their different commitments. Williams considered asexual and sexual life-
history strategies to be competing within populations. The competition of isolated taxa was not a matter
of selection for him, but of competitive exclusion (Table 1). The cost of meiosis for Williams meant the
reduction in transmission of genes to the next generation. This is also called the cost of ‘gene sharing,’
‘genome dilution’ or ‘outcrossing’ (e.g., Lloyd 1980; Lewis 1987; Lehtonen et al. 2012).
Difference Williams Maynard Smith
cost of sex = cost of meiosis/gamete cooperation cost of males
paradox of sex means crisis problem (mute on crisis)
MR & MS relation not clear separate issues
isolated sexual & asexual taxa part of ecology part of evolutionary biology
in the long run, sex retards adaptation8 accelerates adaptation
Table 1: Further differences resulting from their parallax in perspectives
The chance a particular allele has of becoming part of a gamete is 1 in asexual reproduction, com-
pared with 0.5 in a fair meiosis. This is irrelevant to an asexual mutant that is reproductively isolated
from its sexual competitors, because the competition between isolated taxa depends on their respective
rates of increase. For a genetically isolated, asexual clone, transmitting all its genes to all its offspring
offers no benefit if its rate of increase does not also exceed that of the competing sexual population.
For example, a hermaphrodite investing half its reproductive resources (½R) into haploid eggs and
the other half into sperm will not be ousted by a mutant producing asexually developing eggs equivalent
to ½R by virtue of their being diploid. Only a mutant able to convert the ½R for sperm into additional
offspring will have an advantage. If that latter half is also transformed into asexual eggs, the mutant will
be genetically isolated from the sexual population, and its advantage will be due to its eliminating the cost
of the male function entirely.
If, however, the male function remains operative, ½R will be invested into asexual eggs and the other
½R into haploid sperm that can still fertilise the eggs of fully sexual hermaphrodites. That is, the female
function of the mutant will be asexual, but the male function will still be sexual. The mutant will not be
completely isolated genetically from the sexual population, and the phenomenon of genome dilution will
occur.
Charlesworth (1980) considered this case for outbreeding hermaphrodites. As genome dilution affects
the mutant’s investment in sperm but not in eggs, it will gain a 1.5-fold advantage. The mutant pays the
cost of 50% genome dilution for its sperm (½R∙0:5 = ¼R) but not for its eggs (½R∙1). The sum (¾R)
will be 1.5 times the return on investment for fully sexual outbreeding (½R∙0:5 + ½R∙0:5 = ½R).
The population consequences are more complex than the individual benefits and depend on whether the
mutant sperm transforms fertilised eggs into asexual or sexual phenotypes.
7 “All else equal” means that asexual mutants are as fecund and fit as sexual females, that the latter invest half their repro-
ductive resources into sons, and that males contribute nothing but genes to reproduction. Only if this ceteris paribus clause
holds will the cost of sex be twofold.
8“The possibility should also be considered that a high level of adaptation in the great majority of individuals […] is not the
most favourable population structure on a long-range evolutionary timescale. Eshel and Feldman (1970) suggested that there
may be some benefit in the capacity of sexual reproduction to retard organic evolution [Williams’s term for evolution through
individual selection].” (Williams 1975: 169) The point, here, was that over-specialisation would lead to extinction, when the
special niche vanished.
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Nowadays, genome dilution is often said to be irrelevant for species with separate sexes (e.g., Lehtonen
et al. 2012; Stelzer 2015). It would be more precise to say that it is irrelevant for asexual mutants that are
genetically isolated. As the following case shows, hermaphroditism is only contingently related to genome
dilution. In cyclic parthenogenesis, mutant clones can produce mating males when environmental factors
trigger the alternation of generations, but keep producing females asexually through parthenogenesis. In
this case, the mutant clone is like the mutant hermaphrodite described above, in that its male function is
sexual and its female function asexual, but the sexual functions are allocated to different individuals. The
sexes are separate, yet genome dilution still applies.
Because Maynard Smith saw the MS as a matter of selection between a sexual population and ge-
netically isolated asexual clones, he needed a concept applicable to this situation. The cost of meiosis,
however, only applied to competition between alleles within one population. Maynard Smith (1974:
300; 1978: 3) rejected Williams’s (1971: 13; 1975: 9ff.) conception of the cost of meiosis, arguing that
it does not occur in isogamous species, because each haploid gamete contributes equal resources to the
zygote. Here, a zygote should be twice as large and fertile as an asexual competitor. He instead located
the cost of sex in males that contribute nothing but DNA to reproduction. This was in keeping with his
first formulation of the problem in Maynard Smith (1958: 138, see quote above).
Williams’s conception of the cost of sex as the cost of transmitting only half one’s genes to a gamete in
meiosis caused misunderstandings with other researchers from the beginning. For example, addressing
his earlier self in the third person, Ghiselin (1988: 16) recounted an episode of Williams reviewing one of
his submissions:
Williams, who reviewed the paper [Ghiselin (1969)] for the journal in which it appeared,
responded by drawing attention to a point that both of them had overlooked, but that had
come to his attention from a book by Maynard Smith (1966) [the second edition of May-
nard Smith 1958]: that mictic females pass on half as many genes to the next generation
as parthenogenetic females do. Ghiselin was not very impressed, suggesting, among other
things, that parthenogenetic clones are not part of the sexual population. This of course was
the “paradox of meiosis,” which suggested that any proper theory of sex would have to give
not just a competitive edge, but a twofold competitive edge, to organisms that reproduce
sexually.
Unfortunately, the initial letter from Williams to Ghiselin is missing from the George C. Williams Collection
(Lynn Toscano, pers. comm.), but Ghiselin’s response sheds a light on a common misunderstanding of
Williams’s conception:
You have assumed that a parthenogenetic form would have twice as many offspring as a
sexual one. Actually, as you seem to imply, the sexual organism has just as many offspring,
but only transmits half as much of its genome to each. Now, the crucial issue is, would
parthenogenesis increase its possessor’s contribution to the gene pool of its species? If the
parthenogenesis were complete, the answer would certainly be no, for parthenogenesis would
of necessity exclude gene flow into the population. (Ghiselin, 21 May 1968)
That is, Ghiselin simply rejectedWilliams’s premise that sexual and asexual life-history strategies compete
within one species.
A review byWilliams of a submission to the Journal of Theoretical Biology (Treisman and Dawkins 1976),
however, shows thatWilliams understood the difference between the cost of meiosis and that of males very
well:
With their making sexual and asexual reproductive modes to define separate populations,
they should invoke, not selection theory but competitive exclusion. If the populations need
the same resources, I would assume that the competition would be won by the population
that does not waste resources on males. (Williams, 13 Nov 1975)
That is, Williams clearly saw the cost of males, but he relegated it to ecology rather than evolution. He
published this distinction in reviewing Maynard Smith’s book:
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I think that the primary disadvantage of sexual reproduction in relation to asexual is most
fruitfully formulated as a paradox of kin selection—an organism devotes resources to the
production and care of a more distant (r = 0:5) rather than a close (r = 1) relative. This
formulation provides a number of advantages. In its focus on genes identical by descent, kin
selection is genetically explicit and relates directly to evolution. Maynard Smith’s economic
argument (resources wasted on males) makes it easy to overlook the fundamental distinction
between (1) the evolutionary problem of sexual and asexual reproduction as alternative char-
acter states in a population, and (2) the purely ecological question of competition between a
clone and a Mendelian population. (Williams 1978: 298)
Williams (1980) affirmed this distinction9, and he went on to specify his genetic concept as the sociobi-
ological cost of gamete cooperation (Williams 1980: 372), when kin selection is prevented by outbreeding
(see also Williams 1988: 294f; Dagg 2012). He wondered why a cheat-mutation does not spread that ex-
cludes the haploid genome of the other gamete, when gametes are unrelated? Egg piracy, now known as
androgenesis (McKone and Halpern 2003), was Williams’s counter-example. In egg piracy male gametes
incur no cost but reap a twofold benefit from cheating eggs. Isogamous species also pay this cost, but it
declines with inbreeding. Self-fertilisation will effectively prevent cheats from invading a population.
These different conceptions of the cost of sex agreed with the researchers’ different perspectives.
Maynard Smith (1978) conceived the MS as a matter of competition between isolated asexual and sex-
ual taxa and separated this issue conceptually from the MR within a population/species. He therefore
needed to see asexual mutants as isolated from the sexual population and proposed a concept applying
to that situation. Williams, on the other hand, considered asexual and sexual life-history strategies to
be competing within one population. The competition of isolated taxa was a matter of ecology to him.
He therefore could not switch to the cost of males when his concept lost favour, and suggested the cost
of gamete cooperation within out-crossing species instead (Williams 1980; 1988). This kept the issue a
matter of selection within species.
Some life-history models of Williams could yield an immediate benefit
Williams and Mitton (1973) stated the established view as follows:
Those who have seriously concerned themselves with the evolutionary significance of sexu-
ality have almost universally rejected any possibility of sexual reproduction being a favorable
character in the usual sense of giving an immediate advantage in relation to an alternative
character (asexual reproduction). (Williams and Mitton 1973: 545)
They went on to propose an improved theory, based on individual selection, in terms of life-cycle models
(Williams and Mitton 1973; Williams 1975).
These started from cyclic parthenogenesis (as in the aphid-rotifer model) and arrived at life-cycles with
no asexual mode (as in the elm-oyster model). They either assumed a recurring dispersal of offspring into
uncertain environments (aphid-rotifer model) or a saturated environment with fine-grained heterogeneity,
in which only those genotypes with the best genetic fit to a rare vacancy survived (elm-oyster model).
That is, a clonal offspring would usually fit best a patch already occupied by its own parent and would
suffer from sib competition, whereas a sexually-produced offspring might rarely fit best into an opening
elsewhere. That is, Williams tried to solve the paradox within his initial life-history perspective.
Proclaiming crisis as a call to arms against group selection
Williams (1975) proclaimed a crisis in one sentence, but proposed to remedy it by making minimal mod-
ifications to his theory.
9“I believe that understanding has been hampered by failure to distinguish the ecological from the evolutionary problem of
sexuality. In important ways, insights gained from conceptual or experimental comparisons of sexual populations and competing
clones (the ecological problem) may be misleading in relation to sexual and clonal reproduction as alternative processes in a
population (the evolutionary question with which I am concerned here).” (Williams 1980: 372)
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This book is written from a conviction that the prevalence of sexual reproduction in higher
plants and animals is inconsistent with current evolutionary theory. My purpose is to propose
minimal modifications of the theory in order to account for the persistence of so seemingly
maladaptive a character. Many well informed readers may disagree with much of my reason-
ing, but I hope at least to convince them that there is a kind of crisis at hand in evolutionary
biology. (Williams 1975: v)
How does identifying a crisis fit with making only minimal modifications? The following statement sug-
gests that the purpose of proclaiming this crisis was a call to arms:
You may not have noticed, but the resulting crisis was heard in laboratories and lecture halls
around the world. A new generation of evolutionary biologists heard the battle cry and went
on the offensive. (Michod 1995: xvi)
The paradox meant crisis for Williams because he had argued that group selection was practically irrele-
vant and because he had suggested an alternative explanation for the MS (Williams [1966]1996: chapter
5) which continued to fail Maynard Smith’s scrutiny. Maynard Smith, on the other hand, had allowed an
exceptional and limited role for group (species) selection within the MS as early as 1958. Consequently,
a containment of group selection within the MS was okay for him, and he never used terms eliciting the
spectre of crisis.
Maynard Smith on 23 Feb. 1975: letter to Williams
Having read Williams’s book (1975), Maynard Smith addressed some of its points. He first stated that
the life-history perspective (which he called ‘the comparative approach’) was compatible with his view.
Therefore, let us accept that, if there are sexual and vegetative phases in a life cycle, the sex-
ual one almost always precedes dispersal. This seems compatible with a “species-selection”
explanation (? should we distinguish between “group” and “species” selection?). i.e. Those
species which abandoned sex are (mostly) extinct. But, within a species, those individuals
which use sex only for dispersal are fitter than those which use sex all the time. (I’m not sure
this argument makes sense!) (Maynard Smith, 23 Feb. 1975; square brackets in the original
were replaced by parentheses)
Williams (1975) claimed that an immediate benefit for sexual reproduction must exist in species, where
both modes of reproduction coexist stably within a life-cycle. Otherwise the asexual mode would increase
at the expense of the sexual. Maynard Smith thought that this ‘balance argument’ was not cogent.
This argument is decisively in favour of an immediate advantage for sex—but only in those
cases where there is no “dispersive” difference between the two methods. Thus suppose a
strawberry can reproduce asexually (by runners) or sexually (by dispersive seeds). Suppose
all individuals are genetically identical, except for a set of alleles altering the balance between
sexual and asexual methods. Presumably both methods would remain, because of the ad-
vantage of dispersion. But if a mutant able to produce dispersive asexual seeds were to arise,
it would be established. It follows that your argument, to be decisive, requires evidence that
asexual methods of producing all “physiological” types of propagule are possible, and do
arise by mutation. Otherwise, I could explain strawberries as you explain vertebrates. […]
But I don’t think you distinguish clearly enough between cases in which we can be sure
the balance is between sexual and asexual methods, and those in which it might be between
dispersal and local growth. (Maynard Smith, 23 Feb. 1975)
Where Williams (1975) explained the relative lack of asexual vertebrates with evolutionary constraints,
Maynard Smith also invoked constraints on producing dispersal stages asexually (see alsoMaynard Smith
1978: 61f).
Thereafter, he expressed that he was happy with Williams’s life-history models, but that one assump-
tion made it difficult to model them more rigorously:
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Unfortunately, if you assume that each  lays several eggs in each “patch”, analytical models
become very difficult. I have aMonte Carlo model of this kind running. I am confident it can
give a short-term advantage to sex. It is really only an extension of your models. (Maynard
Smith, 23 Feb. 1975)
Life histories that do the trick are unlikely to exist in real species
Maynard Smith published the above-mentioned Monte Carlo model in 1976. He translated the life-
history models of Williams and Mitton (1973) into stochastic simulations with environmental hetero-
geneity on a fine-grained scale, and in which sibs competed for patches, but not with their parents. This
reflected Williams’s assumption that each female lays several eggs in each patch (see quote above).
Maynard Smith (1976: 248ff) found that sexual reproduction would be advantageous through reduc-
ing sib-competition only if none of the different selective features of a patch were correlated and none
of the different genes under selection were correlated either. Although the model could yield a twofold
immediate advantage for sex in theory, these requirements made it seem inapplicable to reality. Maynard
Smith (1976: 257) concluded: “One is left with the feeling that some essential feature of the situation is
being overlooked.”
4 Conclusion
Williams and Maynard Smith used their different perspectives in a mutually enlightening way, similar to
the way our brains use the parallax of our eyes to gain information about three-dimensional relations. In
this way they could recognise and raise a problem that had thitherto not been seen clearly. This required
a high degree of mutual respect and trust in each other’s observations. This dynamic exemplifies a form
of interaction that was both critical and constructive at the same time. It turned neither into an infertile
controversy nor into so close a cooperation that it yielded co-authored research articles. (They only ever
co-authored a short comment, refuting a letter to the editors of The American Naturalist in one paragraph;
see Maynard Smith and Williams 1976.) But their interaction resulted in seminal publications on both
sides that raised the maintenance of sex as a major issue for evolutionary biology.
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